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No Laughing Matter: Political Humor and Media in Egypt’s January’ 25th Revolution
“Every tiny joke is a revolution.” -George Orwell
I. Introduction
On January 25th, 2011, thousands of Egyptians came to Tahrir Square to protest thenPresident Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic regime. They were armed with a savvy tool: humor. The
frequent examples of political humor within the revolution—including Twitter accounts poking
fun at Mubarak (Nunnes Idle and Soueif 2011) and other funny examples of political dissent—
reflect the prevalence of humor within Egyptian society.1 Political jokes2 were widely prominent
in the decade preceding the revolution as a form of covert criticism of Mubarak and his regime.
People shared political jokes on social media and published them in independent newspapers in
the 2000s, and once the revolution began, political humor expanded into the street via graffiti
and homemade signs. Political humor encouraged individuals to express their political criticisms
of Mubarak more openly by turning his regime into a joke at which the public could laugh
(Anagondahalli and Khamis 2021). Although political humor had been part of Egyptian politics
for decades before the uprising, I will be focusing on the unique role it played in creating new
opportunities for dissent within Egyptian society via its distribution in subversive newspapers
and social media, and its establishment of informal communication channels between dissenting
individuals.

1

The Egyptians are well-known for their affinity for jokes. Political jokes date back to the Pharaohs of Egypt,
indicating a trend that positions humor firmly within the fabric of Egyptian society. They are nicknamed ibn nukta
(son of the joke) by other Arabs due to their wit and love of humor. For more see Samer S. Shehata, “The Politics of
Laughter: Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek in Egyptian Political Jokes,” Folklore 103, no. 1 (1992): pp. 75-91,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0015587x.1992.9715831.
2
I define political jokes as jokes that require political context to be understood. This context could include
knowledge of a political leader or their policies, current events within a country, or other matters that are political in
nature.
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There is a great deal of humorous content from the January 25th Revolution and the
decade preceding it, including political cartoons, humor blogs, graphic novels and more.
However, scholarly analyses of the uprising have not paid close attention to how humor
functioned as a communication and mobilization resource within subversive information
networks during this period in Egyptian history (see Armbrust and El-Ghobashy 2019).3 In my
preliminary research, I noticed that subversive content was often carefully conveyed within a
joke, indicating an intentional use of humor that enabled dissent among Egyptians in a way that
demonstrations and other forms of resistance did not. If humor was so prevalent during the
movement, as seen in several photographs of protestors at Tahrir Square with signs mocking
Mubarak (Khalil 2011), why has there not yet been scholarship that directly addresses how
political humor aided in the establishment of the conditions for revolution in 2011? Additionally,
there has been a lack of specific scholarship about how political humor’s distribution within
media sources in Egypt between 2000 and 2011 helped support politically dissenting
conversations in the country. This paper inserts itself within this scholarship gap to offer an
analysis of political humor and media’s roles in creating conditions for a mass social movement.
My research seeks to understand the roles humor and the Egyptian media sphere played
in mobilizing individuals to protest in the January 25th Revolution. I argue that political humor
acted as a mechanism for distributing politically subversive, humorous content to individuals
before and during the revolution. I hypothesize that political humor was crucial in creating
spaces where people could begin sharing subversive ideas with one another in various non-statecontrolled media formats. The networks facilitated by sharing of humor and subversive content

3

While both authors dedicate time discussing the economic (El-Ghobashy) and political factors leading to the
revolution, as well as social media’s influence on the revolution (Armbrust), they do not focus on political jokes or
humorous elements within the revolution. I will fill that research gap in my thesis.
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facilitated political conversations that became the impetus for political movements like the 2004
Kifaya, 2008 April 6 Youth, and 2010 We Are All Khaled Said movements, and, eventually, the
2011 January 25th Revolution. In the 2000s, I hypothesize that social media was used to organize
protests, and that independent media supplemented this insurgent political discourse by
publishing subversive political jokes. Once subversive discourse was established within these
early social movements and media sources, the January 25th Revolution built on these existing
networks to allow humorous subversive content, delivered across varying mediums like protest
signs and street art, to permeate political discourse to such a degree that elites in power had to
respond to revolutionary demands.
In the ten years preceding the revolution, political jokes took on many forms, including
political cartoons.4 Caricatures depicting political issues in a subversive manner were primarily
found in independent newspapers during the 2000s, offering a new avenue for implicit political
discourse that deviated from the regime’s official political message (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012).
Creators of these jokes covered current events without directly naming the issues they had with
their government’s leadership, which allowed them to circumvent some of the restrictions that
Mubarak placed around public political dissent. With the arrival of the Internet, social media
itself became a space where insurgent political discourse flourished, lending itself to the
organization and publicization of mass demonstrations like the Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We
Are All Khaled Said movements. My research suggests that the independent and social media
spheres created the conditions for the January 25th Revolution, a mass social movement that
effectively used political humor to enhance informal communication systems of political dissent.

4

I define political cartoons as drawn comical images that include visual and textual context. Political cartoons are
also based within political and country cultural context that is necessary to know in order to “get” the joke.
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II. Theory and Literature Review:
The theories that will best allow me to explore political humor’s role in the January 25th
Revolution are media theory, social movement theory, and humor theory. First, I analyze how
community behaviors can be produced within information circles that are driven by media
sources. Both independent and social media have online spaces for individuals to interact, which
enhances their outreach within a community. An autocratic regime can attempt to limit or ban
certain types of online arenas of speech, such as those occurring on social media, but the
Internet’s malleable structure allows individuals to work around censors to continue facilitating
revolutionary discussions (Howard et.al. 2011, 7). The combination of engagement with
insurgent content on media networks and physical community engagement can increase
participation in that movement since there are multiple points of engagement (Nugent and
Berman 2017). In Egypt, this on-the-ground community engagement came from participation in
other politically dissenting demonstrations like the Kifaya movement or the April 6 Youth
movement. The Internet provided another avenue for political mobilization and informal
insurgent communication among Egyptians, which bolstered revolutionary communication and
equipped Egyptians with more tools to use against the regime. I argue that humor is an important
element in understanding the spread of politically subversive opinions within the January 25th
Revolution through social and independent media that build off in-person revolutionary actions.
Media also allows people to engage in public discourse in a direct manner within a more
informal environment than a formal arena of public political discourse, creating casual
communication systems that allow for distribution of insurgent ideas. As media in Egypt
expanded to incorporate social media and other electronic forms of information distribution,
media circles of engagement build off of each other—notably demonstrated by the repetition of
Brock 7

similar themes like corruption within independent media, social media, and political joke
publications (Guyer May 2017)—to create more avenues for politically subversive discourse.
These new avenues used previously established subversive discourse as a springboard for
increasingly insurgent conversations. The types of media predominantly analyzed in this paper
are independent news sources, which appeared in the 1990s and 2000s and sought to push the
boundaries of accepted political discourse, and social media, which emerged with the birth of the
Internet and opened the doors for every Egyptian with Internet access and savvy to share their
political opinions with the world. Independent news sources are defined in this paper as
traditional news sources free of government or corporate interests, while social media is defined
as websites or applications that allow individuals to share and create content and network online
with others. Social media is an informal arena of political discourse because it is not controlled
by a particular state or regime, and because the materials shared on personal accounts are
informal as well. Social media contains the power to amplify a political statement or image
within a wider online community. Independent media sources do not contain the same ability to
facilitate real-time political discourse within its boundaries since there are not as many
interactive elements, such as “liking” content, as social media. However, the content published in
independent media sources can contain messages of political dissent, such as cartoons asking
about Mubarak’s dictatorial rule (Guyer May 2017). This content sparked subversive
conversations between individuals, therefore maintaining and enhancing an informal
communication system between individuals who consume the same news. Political jokes in
Egypt have historically presented opportunities for political dissent to be shared between
individuals (Shehata 1996), creating strong networks based on trust and mutual appreciation of a
good joke. By introducing humor as a key arena of public discourse within discussions of media
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networks in Egypt, this thesis broadens the scope of research on social movements to incorporate
humor as an element of this type of mobilization and shows how humor worked to build and
sustain trust among groups of people who were openly expressing dissatisfaction with Mubarak’s
regime.
The Egyptian public’s exchange of subversive humorous content within non-regime
affiliated media spheres helped to transform the January 25th Revolution into a powerful social
movement, which is the second theory I utilize in my thesis. Social movement theory believes
that community bonds are a key factor of social movements (Grandovetter 1973). Weaker
community ties, or ties that are not defined by close affinity but can diffuse more information to
a greater number of people, are essential in maintaining a movement’s prevalence (Granovetter
1973, 1366). My thesis focuses on the ties between social movements that were in part facilitated
by social media followership of certain pages, such as the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook
Page’s 70,000 followers, some of whom were affiliated with previous social movements (Alaimo
2015). This paper demonstrates why community behaviors, such as masses of people engaging
with subversive content about Mubarak within Egyptian non-state media spheres like the Said
Facebook page, are an essential element in understanding how a movement like Egypt’s January
25th Revolution grew and what united the growing community of political dissenters.
Within social movements, humor can become lost among other mobilization factors like
community network building, which is why humor theory is my third and final theory of focus.
Humor is crucial in “facilitating outreach and mobilization, a culture of resistance and turning
oppression upside down” (Sorensen 2008, 185). When jokes are targeted at audiences or
individuals outside of the origination point of the humor, other individuals can be drawn into the
discussion if the cultural context in which the joke is situated is understood by all parties
Brock 9

involved (Kutz-Flamenbaum 2014, 296). Despite this extensive research on humor theory,
further study is needed to understand the exact role humor plays in social movements. My
research is positioned within this gap to directly highlight humor’s position within social
mobilization and the ways it can garner support for political movements like the January 25th
Revolution. A majority of the jokes that were told become infused with political topics because
political events often provided cultural context that is necessary to know in order to “get” the
joke. The importance of political humor in Egyptian society allows humor to embody a more
concrete place within that society since current events are frequently incorporated into political
cartons and jokes, which subsequently created the space for political humor to be a vital part of
the revolution and its preceding decade.
Humor theory is important in understanding what social role humor plays, how it could
enhance the creation of a social movement, and why humorous insurgent content could facilitate
subversive discourse by addressing shared political grievances held by Egyptians under Mubarak
in an implicit manner. Sharing humorous, politically subversive content among personal
information networks creates counterpublics5 where people can circulate this content. Egypt’s
autocratic government prohibits democratic political action, so it is up to the people to engage in
counterpublics, which are more democratic arena of informal politics, to create a situation in
which collective action leads to substantive change. These informal communication arenas can
shape community norms, allow people to practice engaging in political skills, and build
community trust between participants in the informal arena, making them key arenas within my
analysis of politically subversive conversations in Egypt that led to the revolution.

5

I define counterpublics in this paper as arenas of political communication that operate outside of the dominant
public political discourse.
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Humor, being a discursive mechanism of informal communication, is an integral part of
understanding why these informal arenas of communication create space for participatory
politics. Humor acts as a conversational implicature—a part of speech that allows someone to
say something without explicitly stating their meaning and relying on implications based on
contextual clues--which provides people with a buffer when talking about politically subversive
content (Hassan 2013, 553). Implicatures are especially important within societies that repress
freedoms of speech because discussing subversive political ideas without explicitly stating them
provides a layer of protection. This protection comes from the fact that humor provided plausible
deniability to individuals who express dissenting political opinions; they can pass off their
statement as being “just a joke” even though it is conveying a deeper politically insurgent
thought. Jokes fall primarily within three theories of humor that are crucian in the understanding
of the context in which political humor occurs: incongruity, superiority, and relief (KutzFlamenbaum 2014, 295). Incongruity theory emphasizes the juxtaposition of conflicting
narratives within a joke to create introspection on behalf of the target of the humor. Superiority
theory allows the joke-teller to flip the power dynamic within their joke, a trick often used in
political humor when criticizing leaders. Relief theory emphasizes humor’s ability to release
pressure within a society by addressing tensions in a laughable manner. Political humor is
primarily based within incongruity theory since it inspires deeper understanding of the social
fabric within which the joke is based and can therefore help the listener determine if the joke is
simply a joke or if it is an alternate form of political discourse (Kutz-Flamenbaum 2014, Young
2014). Political humor can also fall under “hostile” humor, or humor that is aggressive, satirical,
or defensive in nature (Freud 1989). This “hostile” political humor, in the Egyptian context,
typically focused on leaders and their decisions and was increasingly prevalent in the lead-up to
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the Laughing Revolution. Humor theories are crucial to understanding the reasons why the jokes
referenced before and during the revolution are funny and what political weight they carry.
Political scholarship does not include frequent mentions of humor as a political tool, but
some scholars have dedicated their efforts to exploring the effect that political jokes have within
a society and the impact they can have on a government. Gregor Benton, for example, believes
that humor “will change nothing...it will mobilize no one...it is important for keeping society
stable” (Benton 1988, 54). The argument that humor is incapable of driving the masses to
collective action is directly countered within this paper. I find that humor was an integral factor
in creating discursive political conversations that allowed individuals to connect to others with
like-minded political views, reducing the fear threshold within the regime to a degree that made
protesting a feasible outlet for the masses. Evidence of humor’s effect among protestors is seen
in the multitudes of people reusing the same joke formulas when creating anti-Mubarak posters
in Tahrir Square (Khalil 2011): they are direct examples of how political humor encouraged
individuals to mobilize and continue engaging with one another in a revolutionary context, which
greatly affected the outcome of the revolution by virtue of creating a mass uprising whose
demands Mubarak couldn’t ignore. I will demonstrate how the use of political humor in nonregime affiliated media spheres in Egypt between 2011 and 2011 exemplifies how politically
subversive content, delivered in a humorous manner, cultivates insurgent discussions that
eventually spawned a full-scale revolution.
Upon examining these three theories, I hypothesize that politically humorous content was
frequently explored to highlight existing institutional injustices within the state, and the
distribution of that satirical content created bonds between individuals that were reinforced
during protest movements in the 2000s so that people understood the networks of subversive
Brock 12

communication to a degree that allowed them to feel supported by masses of people when
protesting Mubarak in 2011. Social and independent media sources provided outlets through
which people could access this subversive discourse. Social media like Twitter and Facebook
contained information about organizing protests and rallies, and independent media, like the nonregime affiliated newspaper Al Dustour, published content that was critical of politicians and
their policies. This media combination ensured that people could express political frustrations in
subversive ways, talk about politics implicitly, and also stay informed about upcoming protests
once social media became a more established presence in Egypt.
III. Counterpublics: What Are They and Why do They Matter?
Another critical angle of analyzing public discourse within a state is through the lens of
arenas of political communication that operate outside of the dominant public political discourse,
which I categorize as counterpublics. Within counterpublics, people can discuss current events,
democratically resolve disputes, and debate politics, making them informal settings where
participatory political thought and action develops among common folk (Wedeen 2007).
Informal arenas of politics are considered counterpublics because they operate outside of official
government and institutional sectors.
Counterpublics are spaces where subversive political discourse can flourish, creating new
channels of political engagement among individuals. Politics communicated through illicit
means, such as jokes or rumors, can be subversive when delivered in an autocracy that controls
the spread of information within a state because they skirt around the regime’s control over
speech (Blaydes 2018, 205). Rumors and jokes are subversive because they are not part of the
regime’s official political discourse and can often present contradictions to the regime’s rhetoric
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about itself. They allow people to share their true political opinions by creating space for the
teller to distance themselves from the content and simply relay information. It is especially
important to analyze the discourse occurring within these civil society counterpublics because
the content can indicate true public opinion of the leadership and politics within an autocratic
country (Blaydes 2018, Shehata 1992).
The notion of counterpublics as legitimate sources of political discourse is not accepted
within all circles of political science. Some scholars, like Jurgen Habermas, believe that the
public sphere of politics is the only one that cultivates political events and therefore the only one
that merits political analysis (Habermas et al. 1989). However, the idea of the public political
sphere consisting of a singular sphere restricts political analysis to one plane of discussion. The
single-arena analysis Habermas champions erases more intricate civil society discourse that
feeds into political discussions and decisions. This civil society discourse creates counterpublics
that serve as alternate arenas of political discourse, establishing multitudes of channels for
political engagement among the people (Wedeen 2007). They are vital to understanding the ways
civil society affects political outcomes in autocratic countries like Egypt.
Previous analysis of counterpublics increasingly calls attention to their importance in
shaping political discourse within a country, but it does not adequately highlight humor’s role in
facilitating political discussion within such settings. Within this thesis, I will make the case for
why humor is a crucial element within the information distribution system of these
counterpublics and why that system was crucial to establishing the foundation for the January
25th Revolution. I will also show how humor created an informal structure of dissent within nonregime affiliated media spheres, allowing them to become counterpublics in which the masses
could engage with political content in a subversive manner.
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Media that was not controlled by the state, such as Twitter, Facebook, and independent
newspapers, provided a space where the masses could access more politically subversive content
than was available to them in state-run media. Political jokes become a form of communication
that created informal political arenas within a state, allowing space for subversive political
discourse to flourish within these insurgent counterpublics (Shehata 1992, 76). By accessing
content that was shared among a niche yet politically active portion of the population,
individuals expanded their connections to the movement by accessing more material via media
and witnessing others consuming the same resources, which made the array of political
dissenters more visible to each other and enhanced their social and political bonds. These diffuse
bonds expanded these arenas of political dissent, and humor, being a component of human
communication that enhanced bonding between individuals (PsychAlive 2013), reinforced those
counterpublic arenas. The humorous content served as a political opinion barometer for
individuals to judge the perceptions of the regime by fellow Egyptians (Shehata 1992), which
then informed their decision to protest the regime. During the 18 days of the revolution,
humorous content became infused into the protests via slogans, posters, and graffiti (Khalil
2011). The sharing and consumption of political humor created enhanced, diffuse community
bonds among political dissenters across independent and media forms, providing an area of
political dissent that culminated within the January 25th Revolution.
IV. Methodology
Social movement, media, and humor theories are necessary in contextualizing the
conditions leading to the January 25th Revolution. My paper reflects the ways in which each
theory is positioned within the decade preceding the revolution, as well as the revolution itself, to
allow for a mass uprising to oust Egypt’s president.
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I hypothesize that humor was used as a tool for social mobilization before and during the
January 25th Revolution, and that independent and social media outlets played a crucial part in
distributing politically subversive, humorous content to individuals to lay the groundwork for the
revolution. If my hypothesis is correct, I will expect to see that political humor in Egyptian
activist movements in the 2000s—including the Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We Are All Khaled
Said movement—created space for individuals to bond over shared political grievances, criticism
of Mubarak, and a general perception that others in Egypt understood their frustrations with
current circumstances in the country. These bonds, I predict, were created by the distribution of
information, conveyed through humorous mechanisms, among individuals through independent
and social media. I will also analyze how humor allowed political information to be disseminated
in specific circles outside pre-existing socioeconomic and other societal cleavage groups. This
mass communication network translated online activism into in-person protests in the January
25th Revolution.
I will show how overlapping ties between insurgent political networks that were created
in the 2000s reinforced the strength of those social ties in convincing people to participate in inperson protests, which is a key component of social movement theory. Social movement theory
provides a framework through which I can examine the ties between individuals in online
networks, like the roughly 80,000 followers of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, and
the thousands who attended in-person protests at Tahrir Square in Cairo on January 25th, 2011
(Alaimo 2015, 1). These followers are a representation of Grandovetter’s “diffuse ties,” which I
addressed above, and they indicate how a larger number of people were able to learn about the
insurgent political content that was on the Facebook page and therefore become mobilized to
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protest. Therefore, analyzing activist movements in the 2000s provides crucial background for
the formation of counterpublics of dissent that fed the January 25th Revolution.
Media theory will provide important contextualization for how those connections were
perpetuated by independent and social media, such as the links between the online We Are All
Khaled Said page and the January 2011 protest organizers and the insurgent themes in
independent newspaper cartoons (Guyer May 2017, 1). Non-state affiliated media, most of which
originated in the 2000s, is crucial to understanding how information was framed to convey
implied political dissent to Egyptians. Independent newspapers represent a space where the
masses could engage with subversive content without overtly exposing themselves as political
dissidents, making them crucial publications that established subversive conversations in media
spheres as important arenas where political thought could develop. Cartoonists were therefore
able to work around limitations on freedoms of speech through their work since it did not overtly
criticize Mubarak in the early 2000s (Guyer May 2017, 1). Social media, an online
communication medium, allowed for more informal communication among the masses in a
newer media format, as seen within protest-planning conversations between individuals on the
We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page (Alaimo 2015, 1). These media spheres established
counterpublics of insurgent discourse that were mobilized in 2011 to produce humorous content,
this time directly attacking Mubarak while using the same tools of subversive discourse that were
sharpened in the decade preceding the revolution.
I will argue that the masses, defined as Egyptians who were not formerly political
activists or politically mobilized as a united group, are a notable group to analyze in relation to
media because their interactions with political humor in the 2000s indicate a growing willingness
to engage with politically subversive content. The increasing engagement with this media
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content helped create the broader civil society conditions necessary to orchestrating the 2011
revolution, which included large numbers of women and others who were not seasoned activists.
Within subversive media spheres, political jokes are able to circumvent government censorship
to challenge established power dynamics within an autocracy like Egypt because they are
perceived on the surface to be nonthreatening to powerful individuals (Shehata 1992, 78).
Finally, humor theory will be crucial in understanding how politically subversive content
transformed into a mechanism to express political opposition during the 2000s, culminating with
the January 25th Revolution in which people expressed outright political criticism of Mubarak in
humorous and serious ways. Humor was a vehicle through which people could make fun of
Mubarak via comical drawings and questioning his “dictator” policies in the 2000s (Guyer May
2017, 1), therefore humor theory is crucial to understanding what mechanisms of humor allow it
to be a useful revolutionary tool. Humor theory explains why certain groups, such as students,
would engage with activist movements based on humor’s inclusivity and capacity to create
bonds between individuals. I will also analyze how humor expanded from independent and social
media sites into street art, protest posters, and other mediums when the revolution began. This
transfer, I will argue, demonstrated humor’s ability to continue encouraging political engagement
in in-person activist movements and not just private engagement with subversive politically
humorous media.
I will use several sources to gather data for my hypothesis, including political humor in
social media, independent newspapers, blogs, graphic novels, comic books, protest signs, and
street art. I will also use peer-reviewed articles and archival research that include examples of
political humor during the January 25th Revolution. These sources are easily accessible in a
remote environment and contextualize the role these jokes played within Egypt at the time they
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were written, which will aid me in demonstrating humor’s cultural and political power in the
2000s and 2011.
The political jokes chosen for this analysis are considered “professional” political jokes.
Professional jokes are jokes made by individuals who make a living on producing humorous
content intended for mass consumption by everyday people and are often more intentional in the
framing of the topics portrayed within the joke (Hammoud 2014, 21). "Professional” jokes are
still a reflection of political discourse happening within informal conversational spheres among
the masses because they are embedded within political discourse in non-state-controlled media.
"Professional” jokes and other visual humorous materials are widely available in online spaces
because the Internet contains so much information, including information related to
“professional” political jokes from sites that get a lot of Internet action like newspapers.
Therefore, “professional” jokes are a primary focus of my analysis, particularly in the prerevolution decade due to their greater accessibility. Once the revolution began, however,
protestors who were not professional comedians or cartoonists made protest posters and graffiti
(Khalil 2011), indicating that the use of political humor as a tool of protest had expanded to the
masses. During the revolution, however, people became emboldened to create their own original
political humor within protest signs, street art, and other mediums (Khalil 2011, 25).
My analysis begins with Nasser’s nationalization of media in the 1950s because this
established episodes of contention within media spheres, dividing it between regime-controlled
and non-regime-controlled arenas of communication. I follow with the declaration of a state of
emergency in 1981 that allowed officials to continue dominating official media narratives and
limiting public subversive discourse, and the introduction of social media platforms in the late
90s that provided space for non-state-controlled political discussions, especially those with
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subversive undertones, to flourish. These historical touchpoints established alternate media
spheres as plausible alternatives to state-controlled media, which provided space for people to
voice more honest political opinions. Alternate media spheres at this time were arenas in which
people could convey politically subversive ideas in a manner that included the masses,
particularly those who could access these alternate media spheres, in political conversations.
The rise in alternatives to state-sanctioned media set up the media sphere for the 2000s,
which saw the most outright political social movements in the country’s history to that date: the
Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We Are All Khaled Said social movements. These movements
reflected how new media and subversive political discourse was harnessed to organize antiregime activity. These movements coincided with the rise of several independent newspapers
like Al Dustour, which mobilized political grievances within cartoons to create space for implied
dissent to permeate political discussions. These media spheres created politically-oriented
counterpublics that used humor as a primary tool of opposition communication, allowing for
more subversive content to be shared among a broader public due to jokes allowing their creators
to have plausible deniability when conveying an insurgent political idea within a joke or cartoon.
V. A Brief History of Media and Political Jokes in Egypt: 1828-2000s
First, one must understand the history of news and cartoon publications in Egypt to
understand the distinction between the different media outlets within Egypt today. Egypt’s first
newspaper, al-Wa'quia al-Msiria, was founded in 1828 (Fanack 2021, 1) after the invention of
the printing press galvanized enthusiasm for such news publications in the country. Later that
cenury, Karikatur (,) كاريكاتورan Arabic phrase for political cartoons, originated in the 1880s in
Cairo (Guyer January 2017, 1). The rise in political cartoons cultivated a culture in which
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political humor was accepted in Egypt among the people as a means of bonding with others
through humor about politics, but it was not yet widely used as a mass form of dissent.
The introduction of the printing press and prevalence of political cartoons within the
same century established a relationship between humor and media spheres in which humor acted
as an alternate vessel for political thought and opinion that could be channeled to the masses via
media. This combination continued during Gamal Abdul Nasser’s reign, which began in the
1950s. In 1952, a military coup led by The Free Officers ousted Egyptian monarch King Farouk,
kicking off a new authoritarian era of Egyptian politics with Nasser, one of the coup leaders, as
President. As president, Nasser pursued many avenues of power consolidation in order to have a
total monopoly over Egypt. One of his consolidation objectives was nationalizing the press in
1955 to control the framing of current events within publications and influence ordinary
Egyptians’ media consumption. His nationalization strategy increased repression of free political
speech in Egypt, especially if that speech represented dissent or distaste for the regime. During
Naser’s reign, children’s comics such as Mickey, which included images of children playing
pranks on Israeli tanks, were popular because they were effective at imposing nationalist ideals
onto children at a young age, but there was no perceived “adult” cartoon outlet (Guyer January
2017, 1). Instead, oral political jokes about Nasser flourished as nearly untraceable forms of
politically subversive communication. Tracing the jokes’ origins was challenging because there
was no written record of them and they were widespread among civil society, so they provided a
safe avenue for implicit political criticism. Nasser was aware of the jokes, but he did not perceive
them as a serious threat to his political power because they were delivered in informal
communication arenas and did not appear to pose a concrete or direct threat to his power, which
enabled their perseverance within his autocratic regime. Within this restrictive environment,
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political jokes became vehicles through which individuals could express their true opinions about
the regime (Shehata 1992). Nasser’s declaration of a state of emergency during the 1967 ArabIsraeli War allowed him to further consolidate power and censor the media. The restrictions on
speech during this period set the stage for a new genre of political discourse that created two
spheres: the formal, public sphere and the informal counterpublic sphere.
Under Nasser’s successors, Sadat and Mubarak, direct state control of the media
remained a regime objective. After Sadat was assassinated, Mubarak imposed an emergency law
that granted the state extensive authority to detain individuals based on threat of “terrorism”
(New York Times 1983, 1). The law was also used as a justification to maintain political
subservience to the regime, including in the media. Although Mubarak continued renewing the
emergency law during his presidency, he allowed more space for political dissent than his
predecessors. His relative leniency with political humor, compared to his predecessors, allowed
jokes to relieve some political tensions within the country, which resulted from unemployment
and fury about Sadat’s peace deal with Israel. Mubarak’s implicit allowance of political humor
implicitly created space for alternate forms of political information, specifically political jokes,
to permeate civil society discourse.
Independent and social media emerged in the 1990s and 2000s as alternate discursive
spaces to state-supported media due to a growth in new technology and an appetite among the
Egyptian masses for more discursive news sources. Independent newspapers are owned by a
state-sanctioned businessperson, not a political party, and contain more politically subversive
content that deviates from the state’s official political agenda (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012, 1).
These newspapers straddle the line of dissent and politically acceptable publication content, so
they often publish content that “challenged government-set media restrictions and tones and
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attempted to negate their obfuscation of the issues at hand” (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012, 1). This
delicate dance slowly pushed the “red line” of dissent closer towards outright political criticism,
which aided in establishing the conditions necessary for organized collective action, like a
revolution, that explicitly called for Mubarak’s resignation. The Internet, arriving in Egypt in
1992, was also crucial to independent newspapers since publications like Al-Masry Al-Youm
and Al-Dustour since they could now publish material online, which increased the visibility of
subversive independent media content among younger Egyptians with Internet access. Increasing
access to dissenting political opinions was one way in which Egyptians were mobilized to protest
Mubarak; independent media was one of the earliest forms of media that allowed for content that
implied political dissent to be published, and putting its publications online meant that more
people could then access that content. The connections made via information sharing online were
supplemented with the in-person print process of the independnet newspapers, which made
accessing the subversive information within these newspapers accessible to non-Internet users
too.
The arrival of the Internet gave rise to a new communication arena: social media. Social
media, debuted in Egypt in 1998, is a much more informal arena of communication that includes
citizens looking to express their opinions on platforms without government restrictions (Hamdy
and Gomaa 2012, 1). It includes social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter and regularly
updated conversational website groups like blogs. Social media sites were crucial in organizing
social movements since the regime did not consider them to be serious arenas where political
thought and action could occur. The regime did not consider how civil society could create a
political counterpublic that included space for political debates and proposed in-person protests,
as seen in the April 6 Youth movement Facebook page (Shapiro 2009, 1). Social media could
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spread word about upcoming planned demonstrations to the masses in a quick and efficient
manner. We Are All Khaled Said is a prime example: the page implored people to participate in
the scheduled “January 25: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption and
Unemployment” demonstration on Police Day, January 25th, in 2011 (Vargas 2012, 1). That call
was answered en masse, sparking the January 25th Revolution.
The Internet presented a new avenue for communication between Egyptians, allowing
for the formation of new counterpublics, but it was not immediately accessible to all when it first
came to the country. The Internet originally had limited Arabic sites (Media Ownership Monitor
2019, 1), meaning that early users tended to be those whose education and economic background
allowed them to learn English and afforded them the privilege to access online. The number of
people who could access the Internet at home “via any type of device or connection” increased
from approximately 0.6% of the population in 2000 to roughly 21.6% in 2010 (Internet Live
Stats 2016, 1). The Internet created a new communication avenue in which the regime did not
have absolute control, which opened the door for dissenting media content to be published and
engaged with by the masses. Although those who could access the Internet were a small portion
of the population, they were still able to maintain discursive conversations within online media
spaces. Despite roughly 70% of the population being literate in Arabic by 2010 (MacroTrends
2021, 1), the image component of Internet content allowed non-literate individuals to still access
information within this sphere of communication. Given its informal nature and the regime’s
lack of control over its contents, the Internet granted its initial users space to organize and
publicize dissident demonstrations with greater ease, which was crucial in encouraging
politically subversive action in the decade prior to the January 25th Revolution.
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The 2000s saw the most explicitly anti-Mubarak mobilizations in Egypt’s history, with
young activists calling for change on social media and independent newspapers pushing the
boundaries of acceptable publishing content to encourage political dissent. The Kifaya, April 6
Youth, and We Are All Khaled Said movements used social media as the primary mobilizing
tool for protests. Independent media supplemented people’s political frustrations with comical
drawings that implied that Mubarak was the source of these grievances (Guyer 2017, 1). Both
media sources maintained the salience of unofficial, politically subversive discourse in Egypt.
During this time, humor was used to indirectly criticize Mubarak, as seen by his new nickname
“la vache qui rit,” which reflected people’s animosity towards Mubarak’s economic opening
policies that brough in foreign substances like this French cheese from which the nickname was
derived (Kraidy 2016, 75). I will revisit humor’s importance in enhancing these inclusive
counterpublics of dissent in the following chapter.
In the early 2000s, pro-Palestine and anti-war sentiments gave rise to the first open
political dissent movement: the Egyptian Movement for Change, also called the Kifaya ()كفاية
movement. The Kifaya movement began as a pro-Palestinian and anti-war movement in 2004,
but it morphed into a call for Mubarak’s resignation during its two-year lifespan. The Bush
administration pressured Mubarak to hold multiparty elections in the early 2000s, which opened
the door for activists to organize collective movements with more insurgent aims than was
previously possible (Shapiro 2009,1). Among other demands, organizers called for Mubarak’s
resignation and protested the 2005 elections, in which Mubarak won 88% of the vote via rigged
election (Global Security 2011, 1). During the movement’s development, “bloggers worked with
protest organizers to ensure that photographs and narratives of the protests were quickly
disseminated online” to non-state-controlled media sites like independent newspapers and
Brock 25

international news sources like Al Jazeera (Lynch 2007, 1). These information networks
sustained dissenting dialog within alternate media, establishing new media spheres as locations
where political dissent existed by sharing firsthand accounts of the movement for any Internetsavvy individual to access. Some Kifaya organizers were bloggers themselves (Salah Fahmi
2009, 92). Bloggers could circulate information and images that couldn’t be published in statesanctioned media, making them crucial forms of alternate media that contributed to growing
insurgent political dialog in Egypt. The relationship between the Kifaya movement and bloggers
exemplifies how overlapping counterpublics, one of online publication and the other of street
activism, could create multiple alternate areas of political engagement.
During the Kifaya movement, jokes explicitly focused on corruption, using it as a front
for personal criticism of Mubarak (El Amrani 2011, 1). Some protestors called out Mubarak by
name, but at that time, there was not enough force to fully break down that social norm. Despite
social media offering new avenues for information dissemination and social movement
organization, those who were involved with Kifaya struggled to expand the movement beyond
elite circles. The reason was in part because less than 14% of the population were at-home
Internet users by 2006 (Internet Live Stats 2016, 1). Additionally, independent newspaper
columns about the movement did not contain information about organizing and participating in
the movement, which would have been crucial in spreading work about future protests to a wider
demographic. However, independent and online media’s coverage of the movement raised
awareness of dissenting actions among Egyptians, showing them that political dissent was
possible within Mubarak’s autocracy and offering examples of other Egyptians with relatable
political grievances against corruption and other issues. By 2006, the organization’s momentum
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was greatly reduced, but frustration directed towards the regime continued to fester, eventually
spawning the April 6 Youth movement.
The April 6 Youth movement further established online revolutionary networks among
young, educated Egyptians and enhanced dialog about state violence and repression within this
same demographic. It started in March 2008 when 300 Facebook users joined a group in
solidarity with textile workers who were protesting poor working conditions and low wages in
al-Mahalla al-Kubra, growing to over 70,000 followers in just a few weeks (American University
2012, 1). The perception of increasing space for political dissent came about as a result of
Egypt’s first multiparty elections, which were established when the Kifaya movement started
because of the Bush administration’s persistent pressure on Mubarak to hold elections (Shapiro
2009, 1). The April 6 Youth page’s growth was indicative of an increased willingness by the
people to indicate their preferences towards anti-Mubarak activity. A strike, the group’s
proposed activist action, was perceived to be an indirect way to challenge Mubarak’s power
while supporting demands for economic equality. Given that nearly 90% of unemployed
Egyptians were between the ages of 15 and 29 (A Political Junkie 2011, 1), striking was also a
method of mobilization for youth who could not express their political frustrations directly
without facing severe state repercussions like arrest.
On the page, members engaged in heated political debates, discussed the best strategies
for a general strike, and proposed future wide-scale protests, which would later manifest in 2011
as the seeds of the revolution (Shapiro 2009, 1). The collective action within the page created a
counterpublic of politically subversive content where civil society members can engage in
politics through new channels. The page’s outreach included young, educated Egyptians, many
of whom had never been politically engaged before (1). The fact that the page could engage new
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facets of Egypt’s youth within online subversive political counterpublics is a testament to the
movement’s successful outreach among people under 30. This age group made up most of the
18% of Internet users in Egypt in 2008, up four points from 2006, is another indication that the
masses were seeking alternate media spheres to communicate with each other (Internet Live
Stats 2016, 1). The April 6 Youth page reflected how activists were channeling political dissent
through a new media platform that was not as easily censorable by the state, which allowed
young Egyptians to finally engage in politics in a manner that was not previously available. The
movement’s logo, a “fist of solidarity” (Gröndahl 2012, 21), created a visual dimension to the
movement in the same way that visuals can enhance humorous dialog in a cartoon.
Instead of leading to wage increases, a riot broke out in al-Mahalla on April 6 that
resulted in state violence and death. Bloggers and “Facebookers“ were also detained for their
roles in the movement’s organization, along with university students and disillusioned Egyptians
(Salah Fahmi 2009, 105). To bring the movement into more public spheres of media discourse,
independent media sources like Al Dustour wrote articles about the movement, including
pictures of protesters with linked arms and people being arrested by state police (Reese 2009, 1).
The overlap of blog and independent newspaper coverage of the movement reflected how
conterpublics of political dissent were already expanding to the point where they overlapped
with one another, which helped reinforce them. Independent newspapers’ coverage of the
movement raised awareness of insurgent political forces in Egypt among its readers, which in
turn emboldened individuals to continue calling for change. Evidence of this emboldened
subversive discussion is seen in the We Are All Khaled Said movement in 2010, which I will
analyze next.
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Despite the failure of the April 6 proposed strike to substantively improve wages in
Egypt, people continued expressing dissent within online spheres of communication like
Facebook, eventually spawning the Facebook group We Are All Khaled Said. In June 2010,
Google employee Wael Ghonim created the page We Are All Khaled Said, named in honor of
the man beaten to death by Egyptian security forces for people to reflect on how they are all
suffering under from violence under the regime (Alaimo 2015, 1). The page grew rapidly: ”by
mid-month [June], the page had 130,000 members, and as of Jan. 22, 2011, the number hit
380,000 members” (PBS 2011, 1). Ghonim’s use of ”I” statements in the page made it more
informal and easily relatable to people with grievances against the regime, which increased
followership as well (Alaimo 2015, 1). Directly appealing to followers enhanced the community
bonding elements within his page; followers discussed appropriate responses to Said’s death on
the page in a similar way that April 6 Youth members engaged in political debates on that
Facebook page two years earlier (Alaimo 2015, 1) Ghonim made an effort to educate his
followers about financial corruption, violence by Egyptian security, and other issues within
Egypt to empower the page’s followers with a better understanding of their political
circumstances (Alaimo 2015, 1). This education empowered the page’s followers and increased
collective knowledge of societal issues among them, leading to a more informed group that was
politically engaged and motivated to create substantial change in the country. Armed with
political knowledge, followers continued engaging with subversive media on the Facebook page,
eventually leading Ghonim to propose a demonstration on Police Day in 2011 to protest police
violence and, more broadly, the regime’s policies. This protest blossomed into Egypt's January
25th revolution.
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VI. Stoking Insurgency: Humor and Media Fueling Subversive Political Discourse in the
2000s
Within the same decade as the Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We Are All Khaled Said
movements, political humor criticizing Mubarak and his regime blossomed in independent and
social media sources, allowing humor to be utilized as a connective social mechanism to work in
new media sites on a bigger scale and with newer audiences. Alternate media, such as
independent newspapers, became new platforms for political humor based on their ability to
disseminate funny social commentary to wide swaths of readers and followers. Humor relieves
feelings of solitude and lessens tension (Psychology Today n.d., 1), which happened via the
dissemination of political jokes. Jokes that made fun of Mubarak’s attempts to set up his son as
his successor, for example, created the conditions for laughter while alleviating frustration
people felt at the fact that Egypt’s politics were entirely in the hands of a corrupt family (El
Amrani 2011, 1). Jokes like this were circulated widely in Egypt in the 2000s, implying that a
collective society was sharing in this type of political humor. Shared laughter indicates that
social bonding was occurring by virtue of people consuming the same media that was
commenting on their shared widespread societal grievances. Using humor to address social,
economic, and political grievances in Egypt validates the experiences of those suffering and
”weakens the grip of humiliation or disgrace” within society (Goldman 2013, 4).
Humor’s role in lowering the fear threshold about criticizing Mubarak lies within its
power to make people laugh and bond. Humor develops within a repressive society to alleviate
tension and flip the power dynamic between the people and their leader (Shehata 76). Therefore,
political jokes are an expected societal component of autocratic regimes like Egypt’s. This power
dynamic manifested in Egypt via state repression of free speech and other violent acts (CPJ
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2006), making it even more crucial for the masses to have an alternate form of non-statecontrolled communication, like humor, that can implicitly convey political thoughts while
evading state crackdown. The reflection of politically subversive ideas within jokes in the
2000s, such as the concept of criticizing Mubarak through implied comical depictions of him in
independent newspapers (Guyer May 2017, 1), indicates that jokes are a more open avenue of
subversive public political discourse. These comically dissident political opinions complemented
the insurgent discourse the Kifaya, April 6, and We Are All Khaled Said movements, which all
used social media as a mobilization tool, to produce political engaging, subversive conversations
for the masses.
While social media operated primarily as an organizational tool for 2000s social
movements to use for planning and announcing demonstrations, as exemplified in my case
analysis of the three 2000s movements, independent media provided space for people to reflect
on shared political grievances within politically humorous content. Independent newspapers
frequently left space for political jokes in their publications (Guyer 2017 May, 1). One
newspaper, Al Fajr, even had an entire page in its publication and on its website for political
cartoons (Al Fajr). Because these newspapers picked up on common themes like income
inequality and state violence, people could infer that they were not alone in their dissatisfaction
with these same elements of Egyptian life. This inference contributed to the bonding that was
already occurring through shared laughter since these sentiments were conveyed through jokes
and comical drawings of political leaders. Independent media provided crucial framing of the
subversive conversations occurring in social media, where activists were calling for social
change in the Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We Are All Khaled Said movements. They brought
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those politically discursive conversations to print media and amplified them through different,
but still predominately young and educated, swaths of society.
The political jokes present in independent media paint a more holistic picture of how
individuals could voice insurgent opinions under Mubarak’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s. There
were subversive political cartoons in independent newspapers that depicted Mubarak in a more
explicitly unfavorable light in the 2000s. Amro Selim, a caricaturist for the independent
newspaper Al-Dustour, “’started by drawing [Mubarak] from his back until people recognized it
was him.’” (Guyer May 2017, 1). His drawings first emphasized the figure’s Mubarak-like
features, such as his large nose, without overtly exposing him as the subject, before eventually
becoming more explicit in his drawings as criticizing Mubarak humorously became more
accepted. Selim convinced colleagues to push boundaries as well, such as Walid Taher’s 2006
comic asking if Mubarak was a ”dictator” (Guyer May 2017, 1). Voicing insurgent political ideas
is dangerous in an authoritarian society that limits freedoms of speech, and the simple act of
daring to draw a cartoon helped this dissent to be transmitted through society relatively safely
through plausible deniability and double meanings. Taher’s comic was published during the
Kifaya movement, when there was political humor and frustration being expressed in the streets
and in independent newspapers. Political humors presence emboldened protestors to continue
pursuing political dissent through these media spheres because they were seeing their grievances
reflected back at them, reminding them that they were not alone in their frustrations with the
regime. Additionally, independent newspapers were not controlled by the regime, which allowed
people to continue pushing the boundaries of acceptable political dissent. These jokes brought
private criticism of Mubarak into the public sphere in a humorous manner, which offered the
joke-tellers some protection from regime pushback in comparison to newspaper columnists who
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more overtly criticized Mubarak (CPJ 2007). The humorous criticism was not directly shaming
Mubarak so cartoonists and other professional comedians had plausible deniability of slander. It
also emboldened readers to continue engaging in these informal counterpublics by emphasizing
the universality of people’s political frustrations.
Despite the different roles that independent and social media played in disseminating
information, the former to cleverly frame politically subversive conversation to encourage
critical thinking about Mubarak’s regime and the latter to provide space to organize protests,
there was overlap between the two media types. Independent newspapers like Al Masry Al Youm
and Al Dustour “routinely cite[d] blogs as sources for their stories, offering another indirect route
for political impact” (Lynch 2007, 1). The decision to cite blogs reflects Egypt’s large
blogosphere, comprised of 160,000 bloggers; 30% of these bloggers focus on political topics
(Essam 2012, 146). This overlap indicates that political insurgency was expanding across
communication mediums to reach a broader swath of people and making online subversive
conversations more accessible to a broader public that had access to print media but not the
Internet. Overlapping ties between different spheres of political engagement, in this case
readership of blogs and independent newspapers, encourage participation in that political group’s
agenda without needing to personally know those involved in the writing, reading, and
dissemination of that information (Nugent and Berman). Additionally, the coverage of political
protests in independent newspapers was indicative of an increasingly conscious effort to bring
private sphere dissent into the public sphere. There was also overlap within individual action on
social media and professional cartoon production. Cartoonists like Mohamed Andeel, for
example, had personal Facebook and Twitter profiles, but also worked for independent
newspapers like Al-Dustour. The famous cartoonists Madgi El-Shafei, also called the Godfather
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of Egyptian Graphic Novelists, drew for Al-Dustour in 2005 and established a website for Arab
political cartoons that same year (Arabic Comix Project n.d., 1). These cartoonists’ work
spanned multiple communication mediums like independent printed newspapers, social media
pages, and websites for Arab political cartoons like Madgi El-Shafei's 2005 site, further
amplifying subversive political discourse in non-state media.
In the latter half of the decade, even state-run newspapers incorporated more critical
social commentary on Egyptian politics. State-run newspapers like Al Ahram typically published
content that was supportive of Mubarak, such as a 2005 article that cherry-picked a quote from
Condoleeza Rice about Mubarak unlocking “the door for change” but omitted her calls to cease
Egypt’s emergency law and promote more equitable justice in the country (Whitaker 2005, 1).
Increasing prices of subsidized bread, the violent response to the April 6 Youth movement, and
an increasingly negative view of Mubarak’s governance (Beinin 2015, 1) provided space for
additional criticism within its pages. A 2008 cartoon in Al-Ahram by Doaa al-Adl, considered to
be the first openly female caricaturist in modern Egypt, depicted “a black tsunami composed of
eight grinning faces and greedily snatching hands that threaten a poor man in mended clothes on
a wooden boat” (Ettmuller 2012, 1). The comic landed in the state-run newspaper because it was
not overtly critical of Mubarak or his regime, indicating that the “red line” of criticism had been
pushed to a degree where state-sponsored media permitted limited political dissent within its
pages. In the comic, corruption was mobilized as a stand-in for discussing Mubarak directly.
However, the political critique within the caricature implies that Mubarak’s government is the
responsible party behind this corruption, therefore transforming the drawing from a simple
artwork to a political implicature that reflects deep frustrations with the ruling elite in Egypt. A
critical observation of the comic reveals how Al-Adl did not directly attack Mubarak since that
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would have been breaking a powerful social taboo that had not yet been broken, but she still
engaged in subversive cartooning nonetheless. Those social taboos about public political
criticism of the president were challenged by political jokes articulating political grievances like
Adl’s, and by jokes in independent media more broadly.
Despite its publication of Doaa al-Adl's subversive cartoon, Al Ahram continued to
publish articles that supported the regime’s narrative in the 2000s, which opened the door for a
new type of political humor: memes. In September 2010, Obama met with political leaders from
Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Egypt to discuss the future of peace in the MENA region. A photo
of the gathering depicted Obama walking along a red carpet, with the other leaders flanking him
on either side (BBC). Al Ahram published an article covering these talks and edited the photo of
the leaders so that Mubarak was in front of the group in an effort to portray him as “leading” the
group in these talks. The international community caught the change in the photo and shamed Al
Ahram for its blatant doctoring of the image (BBC). In Egypt, however, people criticized the
publication, and the regime more broadly, through humorous memes. A meme is an image that is
replicated and circulated online, “commenting on any popular topic creating a humorous ironic
effect” (Aboud 2022). Within Egypt’s online communities, people were laughing at Al Ahram’s
sloppy attempt to photoshop Mubarak into a leading role at this gathering, which only served to
undermine his image and give the people another reason to believe that the government was
corrupt. Some Internet users photoshopped Mubarak’s face onto images of Neil Armstrong and
Usain Bolt, mockingly declaring Mubarak to be the leader on the “road to space” and the “road
to glory” in a similar way that Al Ahram used Photoshop to declare Mubarak to be the main
leader in these discussions between Obama and several MENA countries (Carr 2010). Techsavvy Egyptians were weaponizing Mubarak’s own likeness against him, using the same
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Photoshop technique that Al Ahram used in their article to instead highlight the hypocrisy of his
regime and the lack of freedom in the press. The increasing presence of memes online indicated
that more people were becoming comfortable with online tools used to disseminate humorous
images, and that more people were becoming comfortable with these images containing explicit
political references to Mubarak.
The regime took note of this increase in political dissent in the 2000s and responded by
cracking down on political humor in an attempt to limit subversive political discourse. When Dr.
Abdul Wahab al-Meseiri, a leader of the Kifaya movement, planned to deliver a seminar about
classifying and analyzing jokes in 2007, the Egyptian State Security Service canceled the talk by
falsely claiming that Dr. Al-Meseiri was ill (Abbady 2007, 1). The re reason behind the
cancelation, however, lies with the state’s tightening of freedom of expression. Al-Meseiri's
influence was contingent on his participation in a social movement against the regime, therefore
the regime was threatened by his general public presence. Mubarak’s regime was also conscious
of the power jokes had to encourage subversive political discussions given the increasing
prevalence of politically humorous discursive content, which indicates the depth of importance
that jokes had in creating counterpublics that had potent, if indirect, political power. Individual
cartoonists were also threatened for their work. Even when cartoonists attempted to criticize
Mubarak without directly depicting him, as Amr Okasha did when he drew ”part of Mubarak -his big nose” in his comics, they could receive death threats over their work because it pushed
the acceptable line of criticism too far in the regime‘s eyes (Cavna 2011, 1). The risk associated
with Al-Meseiri and Okasha’s roles in amplifying politically insurgent sentiments reflects an
awareness by the regime of the power humor has in mobilizing individuals along insurgent
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ideological lines. The swift backlash to public Presidential criticism reflects the regime’s
growing concern over the boldness of public criticism.
Perhaps the most explicit example of insurgent political graphics that prompted a fierce
response by the Egyptian regime is the Metro graphic novel. Created in 2008, Metro was the first
graphic novel “for adults only:” it covered topics like corruption, greed, and poverty, which the
children’s comic book Mickey from the 1950s did not. The main characters, young middle-class
people named Shehab and Mustafa, are driven into debt by corrupt government officials and rob
a bank in a last-ditch attempt to alleviate their financial strain (Johnston 2009, 1). The novel’s
creation reflects the success that graphics, such as those found in the novel and cartoons, had in
presenting entertaining and subversive political content. Author Madgi El-Shafei claimed to
respond to a "growing community of readers crying out for freedom" (Jaggi 2012, 1) by weaving
politics with creative expression to reach audiences beyond those who were engaged in official
state political discourse.
While graphic novels do not employ as much overt humor as comic books, Metro
employs visual and written storytelling that conveys a story with the same insurgent political
discourse power as political cartoons did during the 2000s. Shehab calls Egypt a ”cage” (Arab
Comix Project n.d., 1) as a reference to the increasingly restrictive measures Mubarak was
putting in place in the 2000s, including crackdowns on dissent. Metro’s political statement about
corruption reflects a growing frustration among the people with the country’s cage-like
stagnation. Shehab also laments the dark satirical irony of reporting incidents of violence to
Egypt’s police force, saying it “would not matter“ if he reported the men who attacked his
girlfriend Dina to authorities because it was possible that they were behind the attack in the first
place (1). Although not explicitly funny, this statement evokes incongruous humor because it
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juxtaposes the role of authorities with the corruption with their ranks. It is also something that
Egyptians can relate to since it was common for officials to berate Egyptians for bribes and
general molestation. A third scene with political undertones includes a murder, with the killer
screaming "This is a message from the men upstairs” (1). The ”men upstairs” are political elites
like Mubarak, symbolizing the connection between civilian suffering and regime thugs who use
fear to maintain order. The book utilized graphics to convey emotion on character’s faces and,
most importantly, present political criticism in an implicit manner that encourages engagement
with the pictorial and written components of the book.
The fact that Metro and the April 6 Youth movement, two politically insurgent elements
within Egyptian society, were surfacing in the same year indicated the increasing willingness
among Egyptians to challenge status quo politics in the state and utilize alternate media, such as
social media and graphic novels, to communicate these sentiments to others in the country
Shortly after its release in April, Egyptian police seized Metro from Cairo’s bookshelves and
from Malimah, the publishing house owned by Metro’s author Madgi El-Shafei (ANHRI 2009,
1). While the novel was released around the same time as the proposed April 6 Youth strike, it
was not published in consultation with the movement’s organizers. Both author and publisher
were accused of violating Penal Codes 178 and 179, which ”punish ’publications contrary to
public decency’ with imprisonment” for up to two years (1). The public indecency referenced in
the arrest was a one-page scene with sexual references. The criticism of Egypt’s political
situation and elite corruption within Metro provided additional incentive for the regime’s
repression of the publication due to the regime’s desire to control all forms of political
communication in the country. Metro exemplifies the power that visual graphics, when combined
with dialog, have in producing space for political dissent.
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The reaction to Metro’s forced halted publication by Egypt Independent, an English
extension of the Al Masry Al Youm network, indicates that Metro wasn’t operating in a vacuum
and that it was aiding in distributing politically subversive content to readers. Egypt Independent,
the English branch publication of the independent newspaper Al Masry Al Youm, ran an article
criticizing the decision to limit the novel’s publication and calling out the regime’s increasing
limitations to freedom of expression (Charbel 2010, 1). The target audience was limited to those
with the resources to read English, which indicates a continued struggle during this time to
expand subversive discourse beyond mainly elite circles. Metro’s contribution to Egyptian
subversive political discourse, while brief, was felt by other media sources that published
insurgent political conversations, and they made sure to disseminate their opinions on this
censorship to their readers to encourage their continued engagement with subversive content and
remind them that their freedoms of speech were at stake.
Metro was the first graphic publication that tackled political and social issues in Egypt,
but it would not be the last: the comic book TokTok came along as another creative outlet for
artists to express their understanding of Cairo in innovative and subversive ways. TokTok was
founded by five cartoonists—Shennawy, Andeel, Tawfik, Makhlouf, and Hickam Rahman—
from various independent newspapers like Al Dustour who pooled their talents to “capture the
mood at the street level of Cairo” (Hills 2015, 1). Their connections to independent newspapers
reflect the overlapping communication ties between subversive communication networks and
reveal the power that collaborative communication has in creating counterpublics of political
discourse.
The publication was conceived in 2010, with the first edition released in Cairo’s
Townhouse Factory Space on January 10, 2011. The publication did not spark the revolution on
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its own, but its production reflects the growing appetite for subversive political commentary,
delivered in a humorous fashion, within Egypt. All 2,000 first edition TokTok copies were
quickly “swept off the table” (Cairo360 2011, 1). The comic book cost ten Egyptian pounds,
which was “affordable by Egyptian art students and amateur illustrators,” making it more easily
accessible (Guyer January 2017, 1). The written text was a limiting factor that prevented nonliterate individuals from picking up a copy, but the relatively low cost made it more accessible to
educated individuals under financial strain. The first issue was also sold in galleries and cafes in
Cairo, which were spaces that attracted the book’s educated, youthful target audience (1). The
novel’s compelling graphics also provided another dimension to the story that fleshed out the
grievances of the characters and allowed people to see their lives and pains reflected in the novel.
The accessibility and multimedia elements of TokTok increased its access within Egyptian
society, ensuring that subversive content was distributed to more individuals.
TokTok hit Egypt with a tidal wave of political and social commentary that created yet
another avenue for indirect political engagement with subversive political content. Each artist
brought the streets of Cairo alive with their brilliant art and witty dialog. The cover depicts a
parking attendant—who were ever-present pests on the Egyptian streets who would frequently
write parking tickets and then force the ticketed individual to pay them off to keep the ticket
from going on a permanent record—in an implicit critique of parking authorities and the
Egyptian security apparatus at large (Shennawy et. al. 2011, cover). TokTok’s creators could not
have predicted the revolution any more than other individuals in the country, but their work
reflected an awareness of social issues surrounding class, policing, and socioeconomic status.
They chose to immerse their work within these conversations, commenting on policing, romantic
strife, and other daily factors of Egyptian life (Shennawy et. al. 2011) in order to release
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frustrations through a creative, subversive outlet. The topics they covered were prevalent in
political conversations in counterpublic communication arenas, as seen in the protest movements
in the 2000s and the subsequent media contributions to those movements and to stoking political
insurgency in the country. While TokTok did not explicitly call for revolution, it undoubtedly
contributed to the growing political fervor that led to the January 25th Revolution.
The rise in political humor in independent and social media sources coincided with the
Kifaya, April 6 Youth, and We Are All Khaled Said movements to create counterpublics of
politically discursive conversations. Humor—taking form in political jokes in independent
newspapers, comic books and graphic novels—provided space for people to criticize Mubarak
and his government without overtly stating their grievances and risking severe consequences. As
politically humorous content became increasingly prevalent in the latter half of the 2000s,
individuals became increasingly emboldened to voice criticism, which culminated in the January
25th Revolution.
VII. The Laughing Revolution: Political Humor’s Manifestations in Social Media,
Independent Newspapers, and Alternate Media in the January 25th Revolution
a. Counterpublics Within the Revolution
Revolutionary or subversive content in alternate media spheres, like independent and
social media, created counterpublics of communication in the 2000s that served as the basis for
the revolution in 2011. Within these counterpublics, humor was a crucial element because it is
unable to be fully controlled by those in power, such as government officials, and therefore poses
the most threat to their power (Graham 2014, 125). Its innate ability to create and perpetrate
subversive dialogue make it a crucial element of subversive political discourse, especially in an

Brock 41

autocratic society like Egypt where freedom of speech is curtailed. Humor also had tremendous
power to facilitate bonds between individuals. According to a study conducted by Dr. Robin
Dunbar, humor “provides evolutionary qualities that encourage group bonding and protect us
from physical and psychological pain” (PsychAlive 2013, 1). It lowers the pain and fear
threshold within individuals while promoting connection-building, both of which are vital in
creating a protest movement strong enough to withstand pressure from Egypt’s authoritarian
regime to cease protest. Political humor represents a political force, operating within non-regimeaffiliated counterpublics, that fosters democratic conversations (1). Due to its community
enhancing abilities, humor was a necessary component in forming the conditions for a mass
social movement like the January 25th Revolution.
After a decade of political protests against Mubarak and his regime, counterpublics of
political dissent were well established among activists and middle-class Egyptians, laying a
strong foundational network for a larger revolution. Egyptians were frustrated about corruption
and cronyism within Mubarak’s regime, as well as increased bread prices and unemployment. In
January 2011, there was optimism about democratization because Tunisia’s president succumbed
to popular protests (PBS 2011, 1). The optimism and political frustration fed a desire for
Egyptian democratization, which had been an increasingly common topic of conversation among
insurgent counterpublics. These counterpublics, emboldened by the 2000s movements to
continue organized political dissent, gave rise to calls to action, such the YouTube statement by
Asmaa Mahfouz, one of the organizers of the April 6 Youth movement, telling people to go to
Tahrir Square to protest Mubarak’s regime (Mahfouz 2011). Mahfouz video spread through the
activist networks of her April 6 Youth movement to reach members of other organizations like
the We Are All Khaled Said page. This page amplified the call to protest to its followers, where
Brock 42

80,000 people declared intentions to protest on that date (Lindsey 2016, 1). This connection,
made through these overlapping politically discursive networks, provided substantive
information to people from both April 6 Youth and We Are All Khaled Said information
networks about the organized protests. The video directly called for people to ”go down to the
street...[and]make people aware” of the planned protests and get them to engage in the protest by
doing more than just “liking“ posts on social media (Mahfouz 2011).
There was increasing supply and demand for humorous, politically subversive
conversation before the revolution that continued for the duration of the movement. The week
before the revolution, tweets referencing political change in Egypt jumped from 2,300 to 230,000
a day (O’Donnell 2011, 1). Humorous content was a large portion of these tweets: an informal
survey ”found that people were using social media to circulate jokes about Mubarak’s regime
almost as much as they were using it to provide logistical information about the protests”
(Anagondahalli and Khamis 2014, 1). This content was not solely driven by professional
comedians, reflecting a change in Egyptians accepting agency for their country’s future and
feeling emboldened to cultivate their own politically humorous and subversive content. Both
factors were crucial in enabling everyday Egyptians to protest Mubarak’s regime in January
2011.
In independent media, this fervor for political change was articulated through political
cartoons both before and during the revolution. Between January 2010 and February 2011,
nearly 60% of independent newspaper Al Dustour’s cartoons focused on politics, with
independent newspaper Al Masry Al Youm publishing roughly 35% political cartoons and 28%
cartoons focusing on domestic issues (Saleh 2018, 500). The magnitude of humorous coverage in
these newspapers, produced by paid cartoonists, reflected how political humor had become a
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substitute for formal political conversation in Egyptian civil society. Its prevalence indicated that
there was enough insurgent discourse in Egypt to drive substantive change in the country.
TokTok’s presence in Egyptian middle-class society in 2011 further bolstered illustrated
insurgent commentary about Mubarak’s regime. These informal media arenas of political
discourse reflected a growing desire for substantive political change in the country in which both
paid cartoonists and everyday Egyptians felt emboldened to express their true political opinions
in an increasingly bold manner.
On January 25th, people responded to Mahfouz’s call to action, converging in Tahrir
Square in the first of what would become an 18-day revolution demanding a full government
overhaul and for Mubarak to renounce the presidency. Her appeal to their sense of honor and
anger at the regime pushed individuals to physically demonstrate their anger by turning out to the
square on Police Day in 2011. Mahfouz’s call to action engaged overlapping connections
between activist groups since she was calling on participants from the Kifaya, April 6, and We
Are All Khaled Said movements to protest (Mahfouz 2011). Her appeal, and the subsequent
demonstration on January 25th, indicated that the subversive media networks in Egypt were ripe
for dissidents to mobilize each other in mass protests. Despite police firing tear gas and rubber
bullets, protestors occupied the square all night and again the following days (Shenker 2011, 1).
The overlapping ties between individuals within online dissent discourse and in-person protest
networks were strong enough where people felt they could transmit their online dissent into inperson action against the regime with other like-minded individuals.
State media did not address the protests at first since the regime believed they would be
successfully dispersed (Lindsey 2011, 1). When protestors showed no signs of rescinding the
square to state control, Mubarak cut Internet access to all of Egypt on January 28th. The decision
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to cut Internet access reflects the regime’s understanding that the Internet was a tool that
protestors were using to spread subversive information. Within authoritarian regimes, leaders
aim to divide the people they rule to prevent them from forming a unified front against them
(Alrababa’h and Blaydes 2021), and Mubarak believed cutting off Internet access would thwart
the revolutionaries.
Rather than discontinue protest activity, however, cutting off Internet access pushed
people like Ramez Mohamed, a 26-year-old telecommunications employee, to turn their online
activism into in-person participation. Ramez didn’t originally participate in the in-person January
25th protest due to his comfort with online dissent (Cohen 2011, 1). The Internet blackout was
the last straw for him and the roughly 5.2 million Egyptian Facebook users, 30% of whom used
the networking site to “’organize actions and maintain activists’“ during the revolution (Mansour
2012, 1). These users were predominately young, tech-savy Egyptians whose outlet for
expression was abruptly cut off. By the 28th, protestors had established enough of a presence at
Tahrir Square that in-person connections, which originated from subversive communication
spheres, had enough weight to continue perpetuating this insurgent discourse in a manner that
encouraged newcomers like Ramez to join a few days after January 25th.
After the media shutdown failed to cease subversive protests and conversations, the
regime intensified its response with violence and concessions. Mubarak dismissed his
government on January 29th, and on February 1st he issued a speech stating he would not run for
reelection again but did not offer to step down (Stead 2018, 1). Clashes between protestors and
police, already resulting in an estimated 300 deaths, intensified the same day as Mubarak’s
speech, when a million people gathered in Tahrir Square to protest Mubarak’s rule (Rashed and
Azzazi 2011, 25). This was the most violent day of protests thus far: plain-clothed regime
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supporters and NDP members rode in on horses and camels, attacking protestors with a barrage
of Molotov cocktails, rocks, and whips (25). Due to the violence, safe houses became necessities
during the revolution. Shennawy, one of the creators of TokTok, was “at Tahrir all the time,” and
“[his] house became a refuge for [his] cartoonist friends” when they needed a break from the
streets (Haddad 2016, 1). Safe houses became micro communities within the wider community
of revolutionaries that reflected the trust that was built within revolutionary networks in a
relatively short period of time. The organization of safe houses demonstrated how counterpublics
can function outside of the state to provide for individuals. In this case, safe houses were
providing security for protestors when the state was the one perpetuation violence against
protestors. There were bonds of trust developed through cartoonist networks that physically
manifested in them using each other’s houses as escapes from regime thug street violence in
Tahrir Square, which shows the power that humor had to bring people together and maintain
steadfast in the face of violence during a protest. Shennawy’s offer exemplifies a tangible effect
that the formation of counterpublics of subversive discourse, first through independent and social
media and then through in-person protest activity, had on the revolution.
For the following ten days, protestors continued occupying Tahrir Square and marching
in Egypt’s cities, demanding Mubarak’s resignation. The protests expanded beyond the elite
2000s activists: public transportation employees, students, doctors, and eventually even
government officials joined other youth activists demanding Mubarak’s removal (Nunnes et.al.
2011, 194-195). When Mubarak finally departed Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh and resigned as
president on February 11th, a wide array of Egyptians rejoiced at the dawning of a new political
era. Revolutionaries “embraced new, simplified ‘anti-regime’ identities, which became the only
identities that mattered: no one cared about religion, regional affiliation, or even class” (Rashed
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and Azzazi 2011, 27). This bonding was reinforced by humor. Group laughter at Mubarak
reinforced the solidarity formed within the revolutionary ranks. The solidarity was consciously
created by individuals who chose to be there to advocate for the future they wanted for their
country. Solidarity is in part fueled by collective aims and actions, which were cultivated in the
decade preceding the revolution through counterpublics of insurrectionary discourse.
The counterpublics formed within subversive communication spheres, such as those
perpetuated within independent and social media in the 2000s, took on physical form within the
revolution. Instead of discussing politically revolutionary ideas online, members from Facebook
pages like We Are All Khaled Said showed up at Tahrir Square to protest Mubarak’s reign in a
physical manifestation of the subversive conversations that they had been having (Alaimo 2015).
They brought dissent to the streets, choosing Tahrir Square, a central traffic circle in Cairo, was
the primary base for revolutionaries. Tahrir Square, meaning ”liberation” in Arabic, became a
bustling hub where political debates and revolutionary ideas were exchanged between protestors
(Nunnes et. al 2011). The square itself became a physical embodiment of the dissenting
counterpublic discourse that had permeated independent and social media sources in Egypt over
the past decade. Protestors formed ”popular committees,” an example of a tangible resource
generated within this revolutionary in-person counterpublic, to protect private and public
property (Nunnes et.al. 2011, 71). These committees were formed by protestors taking the
initiative to create a democratic system within themselves, which is a hallmark trait of
counterpublics. Counterpublic behavior continued throughout the revolution:
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People are forming neat queues – something Egyptians never do – to buy tea at
improvised stalls. Everywhere everyone is on their best behaviour; a few days later,
women will tell me that sexual harassment, an endemic problem in Cairo, is absent from
the square. A nearby hall has been transformed into an emergency clinic for those injured
in battles with the police. Protesters of all ages, social classes, education levels and
ideologies are talking politics and sharing their grievances, united by a simple goal: the
status quo must end (Rashed and Azzazi 2011, 25).
Participatory thought and political action combined in Tahrir Square to create a physical
counterpublic out of the subversive media counterpublics that were formed over a decade. There
was also no centralized leader for the protests, which created a horizontal communication
structure that kept the revolution’s focus on the goal of ousting Mubarak rather than on
leadership squabbles (Abdullah 2011, 1). This informal environment reflects the informal nature
of jokes. Their creation and relatively successful function reflects how powerful counterpublics
were in establishing and sustaining revolutionary conditions in Egypt in 2011.
b. Revolutionary Political Humor and Artistic Expression
Within this revolutionary action, jokes were creating and enhancing social bonds between
revolutionaries that worked to sustain subversive political dialogue and also to create a broader
sense of community. The community element was formed in part by people “getting” the jokes
made against Mubarak. A joke is more fun if you’re “in“ on it since there is collective
understanding behind why a joke is funny, as well as a general acceptance by those saying the
joke that they are not the butt of the joke. Therefore, “getting” a joke is another important
element of humor, and one that was employed effectively within Egyptian political jokes in
2011. Being ”in” on the joke also increased sensations of unity among protestors since their ire
was directed at an outside source—a politician—whom everyone could take turns humiliating in
a funny manner. People felt that they were part of a bigger joke by repeating jokes about
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Mubarak’s refusal to step down and mobilizing culturally significant symbols of unwanted
guests, which I will elaborate on in the following paragraphs.
Tahrir Square was also a place where protestors took political humor, an already
established tool for subversive discourse in Egypt, and weaponized it against the regime within
multiple media forms. Revolutionaries incorporated humorous subversive conversations into
protest signs, marking an expansion from independent and social media spheres of
communication to one in which anyone on the streets could produce and replicate the joke. Many
signs asked Mubarak to leave because “my arms are tired” or “I need a haircut” or “my wife
wants to give birth and the baby doesn’t want to see your face” (Anagondahalli and Khamis
2014, 1). The blending of political demands with these repeated jokes illustrates an
understanding of humor’s unique ability to illustrate political grievances in a manner that invites
repetition and encourages participation in the joke. Formulas for certain jokes, like the signs
asking Mubarak to leave for various reasons, had a repetitive nature that incorporated more
people into the subversive dialog that the joke was amplifying.
Other protestors made revolutionary signs with more visual elements than written words
to bring another, more universally applicable dimension of humorous communication to the
January 25th Revolution. Mubarak’s likeness to a cow, an animal that became synonymous with
Mubarak’s dependency on foreign aid in the 80s, was starkly portrayed in one protestor’s
homemade poster. The poster included a ridiculous Mubarak-looking cow with an earring and
the words “’Muuuuu...barak, dégage (Get out!)’” (Kraidy 2016, 76). This image was Mubarak as
“La Vache Qui Rit,” the image that represented a French cheese company that was imported into
Egypt in the 80s when Mubarak began his economic opening to the frustration of many
Egyptians (Kraidy 2016, 76). This cheese company was tied to Mubarak’s name back in the
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2000s when political dissent against him was beginning to ramp up in the Kifaya movement. The
repeated pattern of humor indicates that this was a well-known joke made about Mubarak and
that, more likely than not, its persistence in Egyptian society meant that individuals who saw this
poster would understand the joke’s humor and political message. Pictural elements of political
humor made the topic “legible to the illiterate and capable of transcending cultural, class-based,
and generational barriers,” lending themselves well to a movement that sought to transcend
social cleavages by using humor to convey political statements (Guyer 2014, 1).
Another homemade sign that heavily employed visual graphics was an image of Mubarak
with Hitler’s hair and mustache drawn on (Anagondahalli and Khamis 2014, 1). Without words,
this sign conveyed the sentiment that Mubarak was akin to Hitler. Mubarak looks ridiculous with
his fake Hitler hair and mustache, but the true humor in the second poster comes from the dark
comparison between Mubarak and Hitler’s dictatorial governing strategies. The combination of
written and visual components expands the reach of the joke beyond the resource-rich
demographic that began organizing online into a demographic that accessed their political humor
in the streets during the revolution. This demographic could include individuals who struggled
with reading because the visual element ensures that they still understand the point of the
political joke. Just by looking at these posters, people were participating in the humor they
conveyed because there was no need to read them to find them funny. The visual elements
allowed everyone, regardless of class or economic status, to be ”in” on the joke together.
Another way for participants to be “in” on the jokes about the regime was by drawing on
culturally significant elements within Egypt. Several protestors brought qollal (small clay jugs)
to Tahrir Square because breaking a qollal after an unwelcome guest ensures they won’t return
according to Egyptian popular culture (Khalil 2011, 110). One man brought a whole zeer (large
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water jug), which drew laughter from Egyptians as they immediately understood his point (110).
The qollal and zeer exemplify the power that civil society, pop culture, and humor had in the
revolution. The zeer exemplified the great desire of the Egyptians for Mubarak to leave, and the
qollal’s significance in society allowed many Egyptians to ”get” the joke and feel like they were
part of a broader discourse that spoke the language of the streets. Cultural significance was also
prevalent in satirical Twitter accounts, made at Mubarak‘s expense, such as
@MubarakTheGreat. The account’s profile picture was a French processed cheese as a nod to
Mubarak’s cow-like features, and the tweets contained politically humorous content that
referenced Mubarak’s corruption and political repression (Kraidy 2016, 76). The account was
created in February, indicating that humorous content was continuing to be generated in media
and in-person communication arenas. Its mobilization of Egypt-specific humor reflected an
awareness of the power that cultural significance had in attracting people to the movement based
on shared cultural experiences and laughter.
@MubarakTheGreat was far from the only example of political humor mocking Mubarak
on social media. Other examples of political jokes made at Mubarak’s expense included a fake
Hosni Mubarak Twitter account, @HosniMobarak, that released tweets mocking the President’s
reactions to the uprising. The tweets included statements like the following: “’Habib...says I
should prepare a farewell speech for my citizens. Where are you guys going? #jan25’” (Nunnes
Idle and Soueif 2011, 52). The fake Twitter account was made to humiliate Mubarak, subverting
the traditional political power dynamic in Egypt in order to give the people power over their
leader by making fun of him. This account, along with others like @TheReal_Mubarak and
@NotHosniMubarak, humorously impersonated Muabarak to hypothesize about his thoughts
regarding his refusal to step down as president for several days. These accounts tweeted things
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such as “#breakupexcuses Nope can’t think of any. I want to stay with #Egypt for the rest of my
life” (Global Voices 2011) and “Reports pro #Mubarak protestors are paid by the government are
untrue. Also can anyone lend me some money? I owe some cash to some people” (Global Voices
2011). These accounts, and their content, indicate that there was mass interest in making fun of
Mubarak’s desperate cling to power, even amidst the more violent days of protest. The humorous
content of these accounts, targeting Mubarak in unfavorable ways, reflects a desire by the
account operators, and those who were consuming the content, to continue finding ways to
empower the protestors through humor that subjugated Mubarak to the mockery of his own
people.
Political humor was a critical portion of the protests outside the realm of social media as
well, as seen with graphic and street artists. Graphic and street artists fueled the creative
insurgency that supported the revolution by transforming the streets into a massive visual
communication mechanism that worked to counter regime disinformation and boost morale.
Street artist Ganzeer noticed that “there was a gap between what was happening on the street and
what was being expressed and reported in [state] media,” so he and other artists used their artistic
skills to inform those living away from Tahrir Square about what was happening there to raise
awareness of the protests and encourage others to participate (Deutsche Welle n.d., 1). Artists
repurposed the city to become a tool for revolution rather than an arena where the regime
enjoyed total control. When police painted over murals depicting martyrs of the revolution to
counter this physical manifestation of revolutionary discourse, artists collaborated in repurposing
the wall with new subversive content (Awad and Wagoner 2015, 237). These artistic expressions
of sadness, hope, and resolve were reminiscent of the visual elements of cartoons and graphic
novels that were popular forms of political subversion in the 2000s. As the revolution continued,
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street art was used to document the revolution’s young history. When protestors took control of
the Qasr al-Nil Bridge leading to Tahrir Square, artists spray painted “game over, Mubarak“ on
the stone lions in a visual marker of their territorial reappropriation from state forces (Lennon
2014, 243).
Among street art, stencils were a quick and easy way to replicate politically poignant
images across cities in Egypt, allowing people to participate in political critique more broadly via
replication of images or repeated engagement with the same image in various parts of Tahrir
Square. The street artist Zamalek stenciled an image of a gun and a video camera to reflect the
“weapons” of the regime versus the protestors (Suzee in the City 2014, 1). The graffiti
underscores the importance of the media as a weapon within an autocratic regime, but also
humorously compares a camera and a gun to highlight the absurdity of the regime’s violent
responses to protestors. Martyrs such as Khaled Said were another commonly reproduced image.
Said’s passport photo was stenciled on walls across Cairo, Alexandria, Luxor, and beyond,
becoming an easily recognizable symbol of average Egyptians who suffered under the regime
(Gröndahl 2012, 162). His face was a reminder to protestors of why they were engaging with the
regime in the first place; to protest injustice, and to ensure that future generations of Egyptians
would not grow up in the same tyrannical regime that ended Said’s life. The connection between
online subversive counterpublics and in-person artistic protests reflects the strength that these
protest networks gained from overlapping with one another. These connections were also
reflected in the ”fist of solidarity” April 6 Movement logo stencils around Cairo (Gröndahl 2012,
21). The overlap in media spheres also underscores the importance of visuals and cultural
significance within protest content, which were key elements of political cartoons that first
introduced subversive content into informal media spheres in the 2000s.
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In addition to providing a creative outlet for people to air grievances with the regime,
political humor bolstered the revolutionaries’ spirits in the latter half of the revolution by
encouraging laughter at Mubarak’s attempts to stay in power. Mubarak’s February 1st speech
declaring he would not seek a sixth term as president, but refusing to resign, sparked dramatic
violence that same day (Rashed and Azzazi 2100, 25). Mubarak’s weak concessions also
inspired laughter from cartoonists. Al Masry Al Youm’s Amr Selim drew a group of Egyptians,
including a dog, laughing at the hypocrisy and whimsy concessions in Mubarak’s February 1st
speech (Awad and Wagoner 2017, 350). The cartoon reflects the belief, shared by Selim and
many revolutionaries, that substantial political change would not be achieved if Mubarak was
still in power. The collective laughter in the comic reflects humor’s ability to facilitate
connections between ordinary citizens, who were a focus of Selim’s work (350). Humor, as
shown in this cartoon, provided an opportunity for people to collectively humiliate the regime by
laughing at it, which reflects the superiority theory of humor that allows those who feel slighted
to flip the power dynamic within a joke to shame the more powerful individual, Mubarak. This
cartoon also speaks to the wider Egyptian culture of laughter and humor while also implicitly
expressing solidarity with the revolutionaries’ cause.
Protestors also employed humor to directly combat the state’s misinformation during the
revolution, which was employed along with violence during the entirety of the revolution.
subverting the regime-dominant power dynamic that had been in place for 30 years. In an effort
to undermine the revolution, reports on state television in February claimed protestors were
working with the U.S. government to make Mubarak look bad and were paid for these efforts in
buckets of Kentucky Fried Chicken (Abdulrahim 2011, 1). However, placing full blame outside
of Egypt was futile: protestors related their experiences in Egypt to Mubarak’s rule, as seen in
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the multitude of anti-Mubarak signs and slogans, and therefore were focused on getting him out
of office. Humorous political dissent had become too strong to be countered by regime discourse.
Instead of writing a formal response statement to the KFC comment, protestors laughed it off.
There was even a man with a protest sign that pointed out the ridiculousness in the state’s claim
(Khalil 2011, 143). Political humor, now established as a successful social tool in uniting the
people against their leader, had become a way for the people to obtain narrative power over
Mubarak. They could refute his misinformation, record history, and express political ideas
through creative and humorous means, which reinforced the civil society counterpublic in Tahrir
Square that pushed Mubarak to resign as President in February 2011.
VIII.

Conclusion
My line of inquiry concludes that political humor was successfully mobilized within

different media forms to convey subversive political ideas and topics among the Egyptian masses
between 2000 and 2011. The expression of dissent within those media spheres established
avenues of communication between activists and non-elite Egyptians, which transformed into inperson protest networks once the January 25th Revolution began. Throughout the 2000s and
2011, humor aided in the creation of these counterpublics of dissent by offering space for people
to see their political grievances reflected back at them via professional cartoonists’ work
enhancing the notion that their experience was not unique and that there were others who could
relate to their suffering under Mubarak’s regime.
The media forms I examined from the 2000s, including social media, independent media,
and few graphic novels in the latter half of the decade, created avenues for dissent against
Mubarak and his corrupt government that were not targeted as severely as they would have been
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if they were outwardly dissenting because they were disguised as simply a joke (CPJ 2007).
Within these media forms, humor provided plausible deniability to dissidents who expressed
subversive political opinions in social and independent media forms because of its informal
structure. The humor still carried loaded political references, which allowed individuals to
engage in insurgent political discussions under the guise of humor and ultimately led to these
dissenting counterpublics manifesting into in-person protests in January and February 2011.
Within the revolution itself, I found that political humor was a vehicle through which
people expressed their more direct criticisms of Mubarak’s regime in a manner that included
more people into the dissenting conversations taking place among revolutionaries. Laughter
enhances community bonding, as seen with people repeating the same joke format about
Mubarak leaving, which in turn strengthened the community structure necessary to sustain a
mass movement like the January 25th Revolution. This community structure was reflected in neat
queues for items like tea and creating medical facilities for injured protestors (Rashed and Azzazi
2011, 25). My research concludes that political humor was a key revolutionary tool that aided in
the establishment of the January 25th Revolution.
My research fills a gap within the academic investigation that explains political humor’s
role as a communication and mobilization resource within subversive information networks
during the 2000s and 2011, but there is still more research to be done about political humor’s
manifestations within Egyptian society after this crux in Egyptian history. Despite humor’s
ability to create a space where people could discuss contentious political topics in an implicit
manner during the 2000s and the January 25th Revolution, the decade after the revolution has
seen increased crackdowns on freedoms of speech, particularly with independnet journalists,
bloggers, and other participants within the media forms I chose for my analysis (Jerreat). Amidst
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the growing restrictions on freedom of speech by Mohammed Morsi, which were expanded by
his successor Abdel Fattah al-Sisi upon his acquisition of the presidency, political humor
continues to flourish in Egypt within alternate media spheres like TokTok, Twitter, and
independent media (Guyer 2014).
The findings in my thesis provide a window into humor’s importance as a tool of political
resistance within an authoritarian regime, but I believe there is a great deal of opportunity for
future scholarship within the fields of humor, media, and social movement theories as they
pertain to post-revolution Egypt. For example, I recommend that research on political humor in
Egypt could be expanded to include examinations of non-regime-affiliated satellite TV channels
that contained satirical political content during and after the revolution, or investigations of
modern manifestations of humorous political dissent within media forms that have existed only
for the past five years, like TikTok. I believe these future avenues of research would further
enhance the scope of study around Egypt’s January 25th Revolution to include discussions of
political humor’s role in transmitting discursive political opinions through various media forms
to determine what has changed, or stayed the same, about humor’s role within politically
insurgent counterpublics. Based on these suggestions for further study, I believe that my findings
offer the first, but certainly not the last, glimpse into political humor’s ability to enhance and
sustain subversive political dialog within Egypt’s autocracy.
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